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You will have gathered from my introduction that I have been working in this field for 
rather too long. I had hoped to be enjoying a comfortable retirement, but the financial crisis 
over the last 18 months has made me work harder than I would wish. Yesterday I was talking 
to the person who is second in command at the FDIC1 in the US, Michael Krimminger, who 
was saying that for the last three months he has not had a weekend. When they go in to work 
on Saturday morning, they say to each other, “There are only two more working days until the 
week begins again.” 
I  am  extremely  grateful  to  CASE and to  BRE Bank for  inviting  me  over,  and in 
particular to Ewa Balcerowicz and to Mariusz Grendowicz for being my hosts today. I also 
feel  very much at  home because you are all  prepared to listen to me and, I  hope,  to ask 
questions in due course in English. It is very humbling for me that you all know my language 
and I do not know yours.
*
We are here to talk about the financial crisis, and how it has occurred, and where we 
might go from here. I want to start by saying that there are two key interrelated concepts. 
I. Leverage
The first one is leverage, which as you know is defined as the ratio of owned capital or 
equity to total assets, or again as the ratio of equity to borrowed funds or debt. As you know, 
the crisis has been marked by a cycle of leverage, with a huge increase in the leverage of 
financial institutions taking on a much higher ratio of debt to equity in the run-up to 2006-
2007, which has been followed in the course of the last 18 months by an on-going attempt by 
financial institutions to de-lever, to reduce the amount of debt that they have on their balance 
sheets, to try and claw their way back to safety. 
One of the issues involved is how did this cyclicality, or cycle, in credit expansion and 
then credit reduction, take hold, and why did not financial regulation do something to mitigate 
1 FDIC - The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, an independent agency created by the US Congress with 
the task to maintain the stability and public confidence in the nation’s financial system by insuring deposits, 
examining and supervising financial institutions, and managing receiverships (ed.)
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or lessen the degree of cyclicality or pro-cyclicality that we had, first of all in credit expansion 
and then reduction in credit expansion. 
Most ordinary enterprises have a debt to equity ratio of perhaps 2 or 3 if they are 
operating in a service industry or in manufacturing industry. Many banks, and I would have to 
say especially the European banks, had an enormously high debt to equity ratio. In a number 
of cases it approached, or was over, 50 times.  I could give you some names that are perfectly 
well known. UBS, Deutsche Bank, Barclay’s – all had leverage ratios that were about 50. 
Northern Rock, towards the end, had a leverage ratio that was considerably greater 
than 50. Northern Rock in July was examined by the Financial Services Authority in the UK, 
and the FSA said that its capital adequacy requirement under Basel II was sufficiently good so 
that it could increase its dividend, at a time when its leverage ratio was over 50. A leverage 
ratio that is over 50 implies that it has a capital ratio, turning it around the other way, which is 
under 2 percent. And under the FDIC Improvement Act, a bank which has a capital  ratio 
which is under 2 percent of its assets is severely undercapitalised and is required either to 
obtain additional capital or has to be closed down within 2 or 3 months. So we had a situation 
where a European bank was thought to be well capitalised under Basel II and yet was severely 
undercapitalised if you look at a simple standardised leverage ratio. 
One of the reasons why the American banks, although they were much more exposed 
to the difficulties of the sub-prime market and the mortgage market, had on the whole not 
fared  any  worse  that  the  European  banks  is  that  they  were  also  subject  to  the  FDIC 
Improvement  Act,  and they were subject to a leverage ratio,  which was in the event  less 
capable of being gamed by regulatory measures. 
How, and why, did we get to the point that banks were prepared to expand leverage so 
enormously over the early years of the new millennium up to about 2007?
1. Factors causing high leverage
Maintain Return on Equity (RoE) when interest rates are low
There was a desire by banks to maintain their return on equity, and that at a time when 
interest rates had come very low, particularly in the US during these years. When the margin, 
or spread, that a bank can make has been lowered, the only way that you can maintain your 
return on equity is to make equity a smaller share, a smaller proportion, of your total balance 
sheet. In other words, what they were doing was that they were increasing their leverage to 
offset the declining margins, in order to maintain their return on equity. The capital markets 
then seemed to require a high return on equity on the order of 15 to 20 percent, and one that 
was frequently held fairly steady. This was achieved by raising leverage. 
An  increase  in  leverage  of  this  kind,  by  raising  the  debt  to  equity  ratio,  clearly 
increases  the  risk  that  banks  were  facing.  But  macroeconomic  management  had  been  so 
generally  successful during the years  between 1992 and 2006 that  more or less everyone 
thought that  overall  risk had gone down. Because they thought that  overall  risk had gone 
down, they felt able to raise leverage without thereby increasing the risk so very much.
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You may, or may not, recall my own Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, declaring with a 
degree of hubris that they had banished boom and bust. There was a general belief that the 
central  banks,  by  responding  to  any  downturn  sufficiently  aggressively,  particularly  the 
Federal Reserve, were able to mop up any adverse effect by a quick enough and sufficiently 
aggressive response; the Greenspan Put, as it was commonly known.
US monetary policy promised future low short-term rates
Moreover, during the years from about 2002 well into 2004, the Federal Reserve went 
so far as to promise, to forecast, that very short-term interest rates would be maintained at 
such very low levels  for  a  fairly  considerable  length  of  time.  Financial  intermediation  is 
largely about borrowing short to lend long. If your central bank promises with a degree of 
credibility that it is going to hold short rates very low for a fairly long foreseeable length of 
time, that is more or less the equivalent to telling every financial intermediary around to pile 
on the debt, pile on the leverage, because you will make a lot of money, because you will be 
borrowing cheap short to lend to someone at somewhat higher rates at a longer term. The 
Fed’s actions had the effect of actually encouraging even more assumption of leverage than 
might otherwise have occurred.
Another  feature  of this  belief  that  we have somehow conquered risk,  that  we had 
somehow dealt with the problems of macroeconomic management, that Alan Greenspan could 
walk on water, was an expectation that there would be continuing increases in asset prices. 
Expectations of future increases in asset prices
Housing prices in the United States had never declined on average,  or at least  not 
significantly so since World War II. They may have not increased for a year or two, but never 
more. They have never declined on average across the whole of the United States since 1946, 
since WWII. There had been occasions when housing prices in certain parts of the United 
Stated had gone down: in the New England region in 1991-1992, in the oil producing states 
when oil prices went very low at some stage towards the end of the 1980s, in California at one 
stage. But if you could average, so you had diversified your involvement with housing over 
the whole of the United States, the experience over this period had been that housing prices 
never went down. 
Therefore,  if  you took a model, and you estimated a model  of what was likely to 
happen to housing prices, by extrapolating the past into the future, the probability that you 
would assign in building such a model to a housing prices decline was approximately 0; not 
quite, but approximately. 
If  housing  prices  were  going  to  go  on  up  indefinitely,  the  sub-prime  market  was 
perfectly safe. No problem! You have all heard about teaser rates, and the rest of it, that there 
was inappropriate predatory lending because the rate at which the interest rates reset after the 
end of the period of teaser rates, either 2 or 3 years, that the reset rates would be well above 
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the rates that the borrower could actually pay. It wasn’t actually predatory, and didn’t work on 
that basis and was never expected to do so.
The  idea  was  as  follows.  You lend at  teaser  rates  which  were  quite  low and the 
ordinary relatively disadvantaged American, the Latino or Black American, could pay them, 
they were not much above rental rates. After 2 or 3 years it was not ever expected that the 
borrower  would  pay  at  the  reset  level.  Instead,  the  borrower  would  refinance,  virtually 
without exception when housing prices were going up, the borrowers on sub-prime would 
refinance. 
Housing prices having gone up, should we say that there was a three-year teaser rate, 
let us assume that in these three years these housing prices have gone up by 5 percent per 
annum. That meant that after the three years the borrower of the same house would now have 
equity in the house which was now 15 percent more than he, or she, had at the beginning of 
the period. Because they had more equity in the house, they could now borrow at a lower rate. 
The way that the sub-prime worked was: housing prices went up, you re-borrowed at a 
lower rate because now you had more equity,  you now had another period in which you 
borrowed at  a  teaser  rate,  so you  re-borrowed and you re-borrowed, until  eventually  you 
became the owner of the house, having paid very low rates actually throughout. The lender, of 
course, was protected because the housing prices had gone up. As long as you believed that 
housing prices would go up indefinitely, the whole thing worked perfectly.  The credit rating 
agencies believed, because they were using exactly the same models, that housing prices were 
going up. 
One of the lessons of the recent crisis, a lesson for bankers and for regulators, is, hire 
fewer mathematicians and physicists  who build models on the basis of data that  they can 
observe over a relatively short period, and hire a few more historians who know what can go 
wrong even if they don’t necessarily have a good data basis to put into particular models.
Regulatory arbitrage 
Then again there was a great deal of regulatory arbitrage. I have been describing how 
many European banks were easily, or quite easily, able to meet their Basel II requirements 
with a leverage ratio which was by American standards totally and completely unacceptable. 
This was largely done through a form of regulatory arbitrage. What you did was you looked 
for the best AAA private sector assets you could find, best in the sense they gave you the 
highest  return. If you held AAA assets on your  balance sheet,  because Basel II was risk-
weighted, the risk weight applied to the AAA assets was remarkably low. What is more, you 
could reduce the risk weighting even more by insuring the first loss, which is effectively what 
UBS did. So what you were looking for were assets which had a very high rating, which gave 
you a very low risk weight, but at the same time gave you a reasonable rate of return, which 
you could then lever up because the risk rating was so low. Enter of course CDOs2, because 
the whole purpose of  CDOs in  some part  was to  provide a basis  whereby banks,  and in 
2 CDO - Collateralized Debt Obligation (ed.)
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particular European banks because they had no leverage ratio, could lever themselves to the 
hilt, keep their risk-weighted assets at a minimum, and maintain their return on equity. 
Growth of wholesale short-term money market
Finally, of course, there was a belief in the efficiency of markets, a belief that you 
could always obtain funding to hold such assets as you maintain within your balance sheet, 
that you had not sold on through securitisation, and that the wholesale markets, particularly 
the wholesale short-term markets, the interbank market, the asset-backed commercial paper 
market, and so on, would always be open, and you would always have access to them. Indeed, 
ever since these markets had begun to grow up at the end of the 1960s, they had remained 
working fairly efficiently, they had been open, and any bank which had sufficient capital, or 
had had sufficient Basel II capital, expected that they would always be able to access these 
short-term wholesale markets. 
Combine that with a desire for leverage, and what you got was a tendency, particularly 
in European banking markets, for banks to extend their lending far beyond their own retail 
deposit base. I have absolutely no idea what the ratios are or have been in this country, and in 
many cases it is not entirely on an equivalent basis, because so many of the banks here are 
subsidiaries of foreign banks. But in the UK, the ratio of lending to own retail deposit base 
increased from 90 to 100 about 10 years ago to something on the order of 150 to 170, so that 
the banks were increasingly dependent on the operation of these wholesale markets. When the 
wholesale markets stopped operating in August 2007, then there was a major funding problem 
and a major liquidity problem that banks had to face.
Of course, all this was amplified and made greatly worse by self-amplifying spirals or 
what I would describe as endogenous risk. 
2. Self-Amplifying Spirals or Endogenous Risk
One of the problems with the regulatory process, the supervisory process, was that one 
of the key mechanisms involved in that  exercise was stress-tests. You have all  heard and 
know about stress-tests, but basically what a stress-test involves is the supervisor envisaging 
some exogenous market event, some change to outside conditions: interest rates have gone up 
by 2 percent  or housing prices have gone down by 30 percent,  or  the exchange rate  has 
changed by plus or minus 10 percent. Then the banks are meant to go away and consider what 
effect it would have on their balance sheets. I have been involved, when I was in the Bank of 
England, in some of these stress-tests. There has never been a case that I have known when 
the banks did not say, “We would pass these stress-tests with flying colours.” 
The  stress-tests  were  largely  misconceived  because  the  real  systemic  risk  to  our 
banking systems is not exogenous, it does not come from outside the system, it’s endogenous, 
it comes from within the system. One of the problems is that when banks run into difficulties, 
what they do, and what you might expect an individual prudent bank to do, is to cut back its 
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own lending. It’s one of the ways that you restore your liquidity, that you restore your capital 
ratio: you cut back the extent to which you pass money out to new borrowers. 
The problem is that if all banks do this simultaneously, then liquidity simply vanishes 
from the system as a whole and asset prices go down. What we have is a process of self-
amplifying internal spirals. Here I discuss the upwards part of the spiral that was operating 
between 2003 and 2006-2007. You get asset  prices going up, profits rise, non-performing 
loans go down, and the capital base of the bank appears to rise, particularly with mark-to-
market accounting when you take the increase in asset prices directly and immediately, and in 
total, into the balance sheet and into the P&L3. If you have profits and capital going up, risk 
appears to be going down. What’s more, when asset prices are going up, they generally go up 
very smoothly,  volatility seems to decline,  as it  did after  2001-2002, volatility in markets 
went way down between 2002-2006. On any VAR (Value at Risk) measurement, risk had 
declined during these periods, and therefore, with apparent risk down and capital and profits 
up, what you do is you increase your leverage. If everyone is increasing their leverage, which 
means that they are taking on more debt in order to buy more assets, what happens is that 
assets prices further go on up. It just goes round and round. And there are many other aspects 
to  this  self-amplifying  spiral.  There  is  a  margin  spiral  as  well.  Under  these  propitious 
circumstances, margins go down. Required margins go down, required collateral is less hair-
cut, and the margin spiral brings about an endogenous increase in the up-cycle and in this 
whole process. Credit expansion and leverage expand during the up-cycle. But what goes up 
must eventually come down.
If you cast your mind back to the beginning of 2007, what you will recall is that many 
central banks, and in particular the Bank for International Settlements, knew perfectly well 
that this risk existed, and they were very worried about it. They did not quite know where it 
was going to come to an end, where the crack would appear first. And indeed, the general 
expectation among most central banks was that the trigger for reversing this upward spiral 
would come from the failure of a large hedge fund, which had somehow taken a wrong bet. It 
did not. 
The trigger  came with the US housing market,  because the elasticity  of supply of 
houses  in  the  US is  very high.  You can  easily  get  planning  permission,  it  is  unlike  my 
overcrowded island in the UK where planning permission takes forever. In a large expansive 
country like the US you can get planning permission quite quickly. The main way that you 
build is by a timber-built house, and it’s very easy and quick to put up a timber-built house. 
Rising housing prices over 2003-2006 had generated an increase in supply so that supply 
eventually  came  to  more  than  match  demand,  although  demand  had  been  considerably 
increased by the sub-prime and by the expansion of mortgages itself. That was the trigger. But 
if it had not been housing, it would have been something else, because the extent that risk had 
been taken on was simply unsustainable. 
There are a number of queries about all of this. One of the queries is, if you had such 
large credit expansion and such a large increase in leverage, why did it not spill over into 
ordinary goods and services prices, why didn’t inflation start rising in 2004, 2005, 2006, why 
3 P&L - Profit and Loss Statement (ed.)
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didn’t the Fed have to bring credit expansion under control quicker, because it fed through 
into ordinary inflation, when the Fed would have been required to deal with that. 
One of the reasons, and this is more European again than American, is that housing 
prices are not in the European harmonised index of consumer prices. There is no inclusion of 
housing prices in any way. It’s not true of course in the United States. Another reason is the 
China effect. You had this massive inclusion into the world’s trading system of China and 
India and the Asian economies, a massive additional volume of labour, and that held down 
tradable goods prices. And you may have had improvements of productivity in other ways. 
For whatever reason, the credit expansion, the increase in leverage, did not feed over 
into  inflation,  at  least  until  the  commodity  and  oil  price  boom at  the  end  of  2006  and 
beginning of 2007 through mid-2008, which was a disaster,  the timing of it,  because you 
eventually got the inflation increases just at the time when otherwise central  banks would 
have moved quicker and more aggressively to halt the decline in our economies which was by 
then fairly clearly going on. But you did not observe the credit expansion coming through into 
ordinary inflation; it just did not happen until it was too late. 
II. Cyclicality and Regulation
The next question is, why didn’t regulation stop it. Well, for a number of reasons. The 
first one is that they just did not have the instruments. There was no proper instrument for this 
purpose. I am going to talk about how the Basel II capital adequacy requirements were very 
pro-cyclical in a moment. 
1. Liquidity accord lacking
Another  feature  was  that  the  liquidity  requirements  on  banks  had  been  virtually 
abandoned. In my own country,  if you go back to the 1960s and early 1970s, banks held 
something like 30 percent, or even more, of their assets in highly saleable public sector debt, 
Government  debt.  That  ratio  has  been  eroded  and  eroded,  and  last  year  the  ratio  of 
Government debt to total assets or total liabilities of British banks was negative. How can it 
be negative? The answer is fairly straight-forward. They had borrowed more than they still 
held on their books. 
Why had the regulators allowed the banks to abandon holding asset liquidity? Well, 
there  are  several  answers  to  that.  One was the growing belief  that  you  could always  get 
liquidity by accessing the wholesale money markets. In other words, that funding liquidity 
had taken over from asset market liquidity. Banks thought that they could get their liquidity 
by accessing the wholesale markets rather than by having assets  which they could sell, or 
pledge, on their balance sheet. 
Another factor, which most of you probably do not know, and I only know because 
I’m becoming the historian of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, is that in the 
1980s the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision tried to reach an accord on liquidity that 
was going to be the match, or twin, of the Accord on capital which they introduced in 1988. 
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They struggled for about 4 or 5 years to reach an agreement with an Accord on liquidity and 
they finally decided that they could not do it. 
Why could they not do it? One of the reasons is that what is liquid depends on whether 
the central  bank will accept it  as collateral,  in other words, it  will lend against it.  Central 
banks  had  different  traditions  of  what  they  would  accept  as  collateral,  and  therefore  the 
definition of liquidity differed from country to country. It was difficult enough to overcome 
differences in national viewpoints on what was appropriate to hold as capital. Those of you 
who remember the discussions on the Basel I Capital Accord will recall how difficult it was to 
get everyone to come into line. There was a pretty rough negotiation in 1986, 1987 and 1988. 
You may remember that the United Kingdom and the United States, or the Fed and the Bank 
of England,  had a prototype  agreement  among themselves,  and in effect  had an incipient 
threat that they would not allow other countries’ banks to enter their money markets unless 
they would abide by the UK/US agreement on capital. It was that prototype agreement done 
on a bilateral basis that actually provided the international threat to force other countries to 
compromise. The UK and the US had to compromise as well, but, when faced with having a 
second rough negotiation on liquidity, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision simply 
said, this is too difficult,  we cannot face a second front of having to battle it  out and get 
agreement. 
Moreover, they said to themselves that a liquidity problem would only be ‘once in a 
blue moon’, that it would be met by those efficient wholesale markets, and therefore if we 
provide sufficient  capital  through Basel I,  getting the banks to hold sufficient  capital,  the 
wholesale markets would always be open, so we do not need a liquidity accord. Without an 
international  liquidity  accord  and  with  the  wholesale  markets  being  open  and  providing 
through  wholesale  short-term  funding  cheap  funds  which  were  expected  always  to  be 
available,  there  was  a  continuing  steady  shift  by  banks  away from holding  low-yielding 
highly  saleable  assets  on  their  own balance  sheet,  to  effectively  obtaining  their  liquidity 
through funding through wholesale markets. We know what happened to that in 2007. 
2. Ratings migrate downwards in bad times
One of the reasons why regulation is procyclical  is that  the Basel I, lending to the 
private sector, the capital requirement was identical irrespective of whether you thought it was 
very highly rated and very secure, or relatively lowly rated. Basel II, risk-weighting, gave a 
very much lower risk weight, very much lower requirement for capital adequacy, on the very 
high rated, the AAA, than on the very much low rated. You got a curve of that kind as in 
Figure below. 
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What happens when things start going pear-shaped in a systemic way?  When things 
are becoming pear-shaped in a systemic way, what happens is there is a migration whereby 
the  high  ratings  become  somewhat  lower  ratings.  Now remember  that  the  way that  you 
managed to obtain very high leverage with Basel II, when there was no leverage ratio, was 
that you loaded the bank up with AAA securities, particularly the CDOs and so on. But when 
things start going pear-shaped, you start moving down the curve. Note that the slope of the 
curve is much steeper at the very good end, and becomes less steep as you get towards the 
lower end, so that a shift in rating from AAA to AA has a much, much greater proportionate 
effect on the additional capital that you suddenly need than a shift from BBB to BB, because 
the slope is much steeper at the good end. What we were getting on the systemic front of 
course was, when the markets began moving and AAAs began to be reconsidered, effectively 
it meant that all those who had loaded their balance sheets up with stuff that they thought 
would require virtually no capital suddenly found that the proportionate increase in capital 
that they were required to face was very much greater than if they had actually held assets 
which were of a lower initial rating to begin with. Ratings migrate downwards in bad times 
and upwards in good times. That makes Basel II pro-cyclical. 
3. Basel II plus mark-to-market was a procyclical doomsday machine
You combine Basel II with IFRS4 mark-to-market and it provides something that can 
only be described as a pro-cyclical doomsday machine. It wasn’t intended to be that way, and 
nobody wanted it to be that way, but it turned out that it was that way. I have to say that we in 
the Financial Markets Group had warned that it would happen. We used to pray that we were 
wrong. I have to say that our prayers were not answered. 
4. Some of the things that are going to happen 
4 IFRS -  International  Financial  Reporting Standards,  standards  and interpretations  adopted  in  2001 by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (ed.)
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Required Liquidity Ratios
We are going to go back to liquidity requirements, because we have now seen that the 
wholesale markets are not fully successfully capable of providing funding at all times. We are 
going to require something that looks more like the kind of liquidity requirements that were 
considered, but were not put through in the 1980s, some form of maturity mismatch measure. 
There is still the problem that central banks have different procedures for accepting 
collateral,  and therefore what is liquid in one country will not necessarily be of the same 
liquidity  in  another  country.  This  whole  issue  is  being  considered  in  the  CGFS,  the 
Committee on the Global Financial System; it is not being considered in the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, and there is a very simple reason for that. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision includes a lot of non-central bank regulators. This is an issue that central 
banks want to keep privately among themselves, and the Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS) consists  only  of  central  bankers.  Central  bankers  want  to  decide  on this 
privately among themselves.
Next,  let me address home/host and transborder issues. Liquidity is traditionally the 
area where the host country tends to have prime responsibility. You probably saw that one of 
the extraordinary events attending the Lehman bankruptcy was that Lehman Europe, which 
was headquartered in London, transferred all its liquid assets overnight every night to Lehman 
USA. That meant that, overnight, effectively there was no liquidity in the UK at all. Not a 
comfortable  position for a central  bank charged with maintaining liquidity within its  own 
boundaries. Probably as a result, the Financial Services Authority in the UK is now requiring 
all banks in the UK, including subsidiaries of foreign banks, though not, I believe, branches of 
foreign banks, to hold on their balance sheets a certain proportion of British Government debt. 
One of the problems here is that this involves a quite conscious move whereby the 
host country is going to be requiring the banks within its own boundaries to hold more liquid 
assets within that country, and overnight as well. In other words, this mechanism whereby the 
home banks at headquarters can simply require the subsidiary to shuffle assets back to it, as 
and when they like, is going to be subject to certain reconsideration. This causes problems to 
the centralised Treasury operations of the headquarter  of the big international home bank. 
There are problems about this. When the FSA introduced this particular measure, there were 
complaints that were being made by the central banks of countries where some of the home 
international  banks  are  based.  There  is  going  to  be  a  lot  of  discussion  about  home/host 
responsibilities  and  about  how  you  introduce  liquidity  requirements  in  a  world  with 
international cross-border banks. 
Required Leverage Ratios
Next, I think that there is no doubt whatsoever that the experience of this crisis means 
that the American procedure of requiring a simple leverage ratio is going to be introduced 
much  more  widely.  The  question  is  whether  it’s  going  to  be  separate  from the  Basel  II 
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Accord.  This is what has been done in Switzerland by the Swiss National Bank, which has 
introduced a leverage ratio which UBS and Credit Suisse are having to meet.  They will now 
be  limited  by  whichever  is  the  higher  of  the  leverage  ratio  or  the  Basel  II  ratio.   I  am 
producing on Saturday a report in Geneva5 about the future of financial regulation, where I’m 
going to suggest that the leverage ratio should be interacted with Basel II, so that if leverage 
rises, your Basel II ratio becomes higher. 
Again, there is a question whether the measures to try and add a counter-cyclical effect 
should just be a leverage ratio, or should be a rate of change or rate of growth of bank lending, 
or bank expansion. Whether that will be adopted and how it will play out is yet to be seen. 
Also, there is a question whether this should just apply to banks or should apply more 
widely, to any highly leveraged and reasonably large institution. Credit expansion was not just 
by banks and investment houses, it was via hedge funds as well. When hedge funds, although 
they may individually be quite small and many of them with different policies, move as a 
herd, they will have an effect on credit expansion of this kind. Again, one of the issues is, to 
whom should these counter-cyclical measures actually apply, just banks or more widely. 
Next  there is a whole issue of housing loan to value ratios. One of the problems in 
both the US, the UK, Ireland and Spain was, in the upturn you could get loan to value ratios 
of 100 percent or more. Northern Rock was offering 125 percent in a programme described as 
“Together.” Now you are lucky if you get a mortgage in the UK at a loan to value ratio higher 
than 75 percent. It is this kind of switch in loan to value ratios that enhances the cycle very 
considerably.
Will  there  be  counter-cyclical  state-varying  requirements?  How  will  it  be  done? 
Leverage ratios? Growth rates of bank expansion? Or what? The second point here is that if 
you are trying to be counter-cyclical,  if you are trying to stop these asset price cycles, the 
cycles in leverage, credit expansion, they are not the same from country to country. There was 
a huge asset price cycle and credit expansion cycle in the US, the UK, Ireland and Spain; it 
was nothing like the same in Germany or in Italy or, I would expect, in Poland. There is not a 
world cycle. If there is not a world cycle and you want to be counter-cyclical, the implication 
of  counter-cyclicality  is  that  these  ratios  have  to  be  applied  differently  from country  to 
country. If you apply them differently from country to country, this means that you will have 
different requirements, if you are a cross-border bank, depending in which country you are 
operating. In other words, you are going to move away from a single global financial system, 
where the requirements on a bank are identical irrespective of where they are operating, to a 
world in which the nation state has much more control over what it is effectively being done 
in the financial system in its own country.
Moreover,  as  we have  unfortunately  seen  in  the  last  period,  crisis  management  is 
really  quite  extraordinarily  expensive.  Guaranteeing  deposits,  recapitalising  banks,  and all 
that. Only the nation state has got the money, the power and the legitimacy to do that. The 
international bodies, or the supranational bodies, have done virtually nothing in this crisis. 
The  European  Commission,  I  have  to  say,  has  been  remarkable  by  its  absence;  the 
5 M Brunnermeier. A Crocket, Ch  Goodhart, A D Persaud and H Shin, The Fundamental Principles of
Financial Regulation, Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11, ICMB & CEPR, 2009
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International Monetary Fund did very little until the last few months when there was a need 
for  additional  foreign currency reserves.  The International  Monetary Fund cannot,  simply 
does  not  have  the  money  to  provide  for  the  recapitalisation  of  very  large  banks  in  the 
countries  in  which  they  operate.  Effectively,  the  crisis  has  shown  up  the  fact  that  our 
institutions  do  not  have  a  sufficient  cross-border  function.  Institutions  that  matter  are 
effectively still national. As a senior figure in the UK Financial Services Authority effectively 
said at a Conference we held at LSE on January 19th, 2009, “An international bank is global 
when it is alive, it becomes national when it dies.” 
III. What will this lead to?
What’s all this going to lead to? Leverage based on short-term borrowing in wholesale 
markets is going to be cut back dramatically. We are going to return to retail banking. The 
“originate to distribute” model will continue.  It had a lot of faults.  Much too often it was 
“pretend to distribute” to SIVs - structured investment vehicles and special-purpose vehicles 
and conduits which were actually part of the bank itself. 
One of the features that has not yet been sufficiently recognised is that the “slicing and 
dicing” and securitisation disrupts the lender/borrower link. If you have a real problem in your 
housing  market,  as  they do in  the  United  States,  what  you  want  to  have  is  a  negotiated 
rearrangement  between the  borrower and the  lender,  whereby the  borrower can pay less, 
because s/he no longer can afford to pay as much, and the lender gets some kind of quid-pro-
quo.  You have to  have some kind of  agreement  between lender  and borrower to  do this 
negotiation.  But  you  cannot  negotiate  or  renegotiate  mortgages  when  they  have  been 
securitised because the holder of the mortgages is now divided up into thousands, possibly 
even tens of thousands of different people. It is this “slicing and dicing” that means you can’t 
have easy renegotiation of mortgage arrangements.  That will have to be changed. But the 
overall concept in my view remains valid. 
There is going to be, I think, a shift towards the host in the home/host relationships. 
The problem in Europe is that financial crisis management is hideously expensive and there is 
no European funding basis to provide the money. It is a fiscal question. If the Europeans or 
the eurozone inhabitants are prepared to provide sufficient fiscal funding at the federal centre 
to finance crisis management, then and only then, can you effectively have a eurozone-wide 
supervisor, regulator, and all the rest of it. There is no evidence at the moment that those in 
charge in the eurozone are prepared to grasp the nettle of the fiscal problem.
Cross-border banking? I think that there will be some pull-back from globalisation and 
a shift towards host country control. 
I am getting towards the end. Lehman Brothers were contagious. When it failed, there 
was a massive contagion and there was massive panic. All systemic banks around the world 
are now protected. If they are protected, should they get much tougher regulation? What has 
happened is that the smaller weaker banks who have got into trouble have been folded into 
bigger banks. HBOS, which would never ever otherwise have been allowed to merge with 
another British bank, was put together with Lloyd’s almost overnight by Government fiat. 
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Wachovia was put with a larger US bank. WaMu was put with a larger US bank. Competition 
concerns  have  been  totally  ignored.  Oligopolistic  structure  has  been  enhanced.  In  most 
countries  now the majority  of banking business is  done by a  very small  number  of huge 
banks, which are far too big to fail. In some cases, where they are in small countries, they are 
too big to save, because the country can’t afford to save them. Look at Iceland. And in some 
cases they are probably too big to manage. Look at Citibank. The big banks have behaved as 
bad or worse than the small and medium banks. Again, look at Citibank, look at RBS, look at 
UBS. They were all very big banks and they didn’t behave well during this crisis. 
What are we going to do about the fact that our banking system is becoming more 
oligopolistic, more concentrated with less competition? First, we could do nothing and say 
that we don’t care about it. Second, we could arrange that the bigger the bank the tougher the 
regulation, maybe even giving big banks the incentive to break themselves up because if they 
remain really big, then they will get much tougher regulation. A final suggestion – I do not 
know if many of you have read a very recent G30 proposal on financial regulation, which 
was, I think, largely drafted by Paul Volcker. If you read between the lines, and here I’m 
maybe doing him an injustice, I get the feeling that what Paul Volcker would like would be a 
power for the authorities simply to break up the really big banks in the way that AT&T was 
broken up into the Baby Bells.  Should we allow Citibank,  Bank of America,  JP Morgan 
Chase increasingly to dominate the American banking scene, or the four banks in the UK – 
should that actually be allowed to happen?
IV. Conclusions
We are  going  to  return  to  retail  banking  with  much  less  access  to  the  wholesale 
markets.  Less globalisation,  more host country control.  Perhaps,  and I would hope, much 
more counter-cyclical control over credit and asset price cycles. Control over leverage applied 
to all intermediaries who are highly leveraged and big. I expect that we will get a twin-peak 
approach  to  financial  regulation,  with  the  macro-prudential  instruments  which  relate  to 
leverage and rates of growth and credit expansion being undertaken by the central bank, and 
the micro-prudential instruments, that’s effectively Basel II, remaining within the FSA. 
Let me end by saying that I think that this will be broadly favourable to Poland. The 
reason is that you are a country where the banking system is dominated by subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. This means that, until now, the trend has been home country control, allowing 
the global banks to do whatever they like wherever they like it. The countries which have 
been dominated by foreign-owned banks have been a little bit hesitant about that. I think that 
the world will change because in a world in which institutions are national it is very difficult 
to run a purely global system without potentially running into crisis conditions such as we 
have had. There will be a tendency, under these circumstances that have occurred in the last 
two years, to realise that simply for self-protection there needs to be a much greater shift of 
control mechanisms towards the host country, which in your case is your own country.
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